Authors: Alan Gilchrist; Andrew Pressey; Markus Vanharanta
Abstract
The prevailing understanding of collusive B2B networks is primarily based on the theories of industrial economists and organizational criminologists. “Successful” collusive industrial networks (such as price-fixing cartels) have been seen to endure due to formal managerial structures of coordination and control. In this paper, we seek to transcend and challenge this understanding by drawing evidence from an in-depth examination of four price-fixing cartels that were facilitated chiefly by marketers. Our contribution introduces the notion of “shadow networks” and “dark networks” to illustrate the continua of collusive network forms. In addition, this allows us to build a deeper understanding of collusive network forms and related inter-firm interaction for an industrial marketing audience. We provide implications for marketing practice, theory, and policy.
Key words: Collusive Networks Network Structure Cartels.
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Conference: Glasgow, Scotland (2011)