

TRUST AGAIN:
PROTESTANT vs. CATHOLIC
DOMINANT LOGIC

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Abstract

“You know, we often say here: “Finns have blue eyes”. This was the answer of a young doctorate working on trust in asymmetrical relationships between innovative firms, during an IMP Conference in a Scandinavian country, face to this diabolical remark: “do you imagine that, in some culture, lying is the essence of human art”?

Face such cultural differences, numerous researchers have demonstrated the relationship between trust and economic development depending on high / low trust values: Historians, (Peyrefitte, 1995), Sociologists (Fukuyama, 1995; d’Iribarne, 1986, 2006), Economists (Algan and Cahuc, 2007), and Management Science researchers (Usunier, 2000).

Starting with an undifferentiated approach, Marketing began to interest in trust in the 1980’s (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh, 1987; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Doney and Cannon, 1997). Trust became a pillar of relational marketing (Berry, 1995) and Inter Organisational relationship (Spekman, 1988). Despite this, after flourishing publications, trust is seen as a ubiquitous concept (Usunier, 2000), ambiguous (Bidault, 1998), vague (*elusive*) (Zuker, 1986), and as obstructing the development of reliable measuring tools (Raimondo, 2000). Are such limitations due to a universalist assumption, too culturally oriented: trust is good as itself?

Using works on the influence of religious beliefs on trust, we shall consider the hypothesis that the European conceptions of trust are centred on two typical-ideals (Weber, 1922): a *Protestant Dominant Logic* (PDL) vs. a *Catholic Dominant Logic* (CDL). A comprehensive methodology opposes these two visions. One is based upon individual responsibility vs. the other states the dependence of the individual upon the whole. One conceives freedom inspired by subjugation (*servo arbitrio*) vs. the other acts with absolute freedom (*libero arbitrio*). Finally, one founds trust upon control... starting from an assumption of human opportunism; the other perceives control as contrary of trust... despite a faith in benevolent human nature.

In conclusion, we raise the question of whether or not the paradoxal point of view of the IMP Group vis-à-vis trust is influenced by the *Protestant Dominant Logic* of many of its members. On one hand, trust does not constitute a key point in its founding principles (Hakansson, 1982; Turnbull & Valla, 1986; Ford, 1990; Axelsson & Easton, 1992; Hakansson & Snehota, 1995). On the other hand, rare are the contributions submitted to his Annual Conference which do not refer to trust, considered as a *buzzword taken for granted*. This marked PDL paradox would explain the difficult acculturation of this school of thought to others cultural environments.

Introduction

Trust is not taken for granted. Numerous works demonstrate incommensurable differences in trust according to social groups. Fukuyama (1995) explains growth gaps according to whether the societies are *high trust* or *low trust*. For Peyrefitte (1995), trust generated by the law of contracts explains the development of Western countries. Economists explain the weakness of French economy by the existence of a “society of defiance” (Algan & Cahuc, 2007). Others consider this lack of social confidence as being the reason for which France is characterised by a “capitalism of inheritance” with the only alternative of a state-based economy (Philippon, 2007.) Management Science researchers have measured trust in internal and external relationships of German and French companies, and their impact on performance (Usunier, 2000).

Oppositely, Marketing approaches trust by using a universalist way of thinking (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh, 1987), producing an abundance of research work (Moorman, Zaltman, & Deshpandé, 1992, 1993; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Doney and Cannon, 1997; Blois, 1999; Raimondo, 2000). Trust became the inescapable pillar in relationship marketing: “*relationship marketing is built on the foundation of trust*» (Berry, 1995, p. 242). The same has been true for Inter Organisational Relationship (IOR): “*trust is the cornerstone of the strategic partnership business relationships*” (Spekman, 1988, p. 79). Can the heterogeneity of this work, which has not allowed the development of shared definitions and convincing means of measurement (Raimondo, 2000) be explained by this universalist, if not normative, approach?

More specifically, the work of the IMP Group is characterized by a paradox: on one hand, the IMP founders did not consider trust as the cornerstone of their models; oppositely, they backed the Interaction Model on a williamsonian opportunistic assumption. More of that, the triad Interaction / Networks / Relationships could be interpreted as an obsession of controlling the firms’ environment (Hakansson, 1982; Turnbull & Valla, 1986; Ford, 1990; Axelsson & Easton, 1992; Hakansson & Snehota, 1995). On the other hand, rare are the contributions presented to its annual conference which do not refer to trust to the point of being a *buzz word, taken for granted*. This is the reason why certain authors consider the IMP Group has not truly gone further into the concept of trust (Usunier, 2000).

How could we explain this paradox of trust unique to the IMP Group, at once omnipresent in thought, but little explored in terms of concepts? The proposed hypothesis is that the concept of trust within the IMP Group is influenced by a *Protestant Dominant Logic (PDL)* which is inherent to its dominant founding and present members. This logic, opposed here to a *Catholic Dominant Logic (CDL)* – mainly French in a first step as a paradigmatic case study -, would explain the difficult acculturation of this school of thought to others cultural environments.

To explore this hypothesis, we shall use a comprehensive methodology inspired by Max Weber (1922), which aims to construct typical-ideals based on “*an interpretation of meanings given by individuals to their social activities*” (Weber, 1922, p. 28). This two PDL vs. CDL typical-ideals – neither “true” or “correct” (Weber 1922, p. 29) – attempts to illuminate the paradox of trust depending on their cultural contexts.

We will try to understand the trust dynamic of PDL vs. CDL addressing three relationships between trust and individuals: how do individuals consider trust? how do individuals found their mutual freedom? how individuals are controlling themselves to allow trust within groups?




Figure 1 : Three levels of trust

- *The first section* attempts to capture the degree of self-confidence of individuals which is generated by their “vision of the world” (Aron, 1967, p. 541). Such question opposed the self-responsibility which constitutes the contribution of the PDL to ‘modernity’, to the ‘classical’ holism domination onto individual’s characteristic of the CDL. In PDL, individuals have to be self-confident; in CDL, individuals are not in charge of their own confidence.
- *The second section* looks into the predictability of the behaviour of individuals depending on their freedom assumption. A freedom inspired by subjugation (*servo arbitrio*) (PDL) obliges well-doing; the theory of free-will (*libero arbitrio*) (CDL) sees evil – and *in fine* the absence itself of harm -, as being the confirmation of that freedom. In PDL, the behaviours are predictable, depending on accepted rules; in CDL, they are random, depending on personal changing interpretations.
- *The third section* explicits the paradox between trust and control. In PDL, trust is founded on control, because control attests trust... despite (or because) a deep a priori of defiance in human opportunism. In CDL, trust excludes control, because control attests a generalised defiance... despite (or because) a disappointed faith in human nature benevolence.

In the conclusion we consider whether or not the paradoxal integration of trust in the IMP Group’s work – absent initially, if not contrary to its conceptual foundations but nevertheless still presented as being taken for granted – validates the hypothesis of the pre-eminence of a *Protestant Dominant Logic* which is characteristic of its founding and present members.

1. The self-confidence of individuals: from the individual responsibility for being self-confidence (PDL) to the holistic domination of individuals by the environment (CDL)

As noted by Seppänen et al. (Seppänen, Blomqvist & Sundqvist, 2002, p. 20) based upon Bidault & De la Torre: “*religion is the most prominent factor explaining the respondent’s approach to trust... This obviously raises a question whether empirical studies and measures of inter-organizational trust can be applied and generalized across cultures and religions*”.

It does not seem that the IMP Group explicitly deepens the intercultural dimension of its approach according to intercultural research (Hall, 1949; Hofstede, 1991), despite his international perspective. However, d’Iribarne (1999, 2006) questions the idea of “rational” behaviour devoid of all myth, in particular that inspired by “religious and ethical heritage” (2006, p. 79): “*Each culture*

has ways of giving meaning which are sometimes very difficult to understand for those who are foreign to it" (2006, p. 10).

More generally, Max Weber, founder of modern sociology applied to economy (Weber, 1922), via an analysis of seven universal religions – his best known work remains *Protestant ethic and spirit of capitalism* (1904) -, showed to what extent economic behaviour is influenced by beliefs of religious origin (Aron, 1967, p. 542).

Using these results, a comprehensive methodology will reveal « the spirit » (Weber, 1904) or « visions of the world » (Aron, 1967) which characterise *Protestant Dominant Logic (PDL)* vs. *Catholic Dominant Logic (CDL)*. These visions allow us to understand the relationship between individual and trust embedded in these spirits.

Thus the PDL prones the “modern” responsibility of individuals with respect to the group, whereas the CDL, in a “classical” manner, puts the emphasis on the whole with respect to individuals. By his initiative rooted in self-confidence, “protestant” accomplishes his duty in the PDL; the individual, face to an order more legitimate than himself, has to submit to it in the CDL. In the first case the individual has to be self-confident and he is waiting for the same thinking from the members of the group too; in the second logic, because of the group supremacy, individual could not be confident in himself and by the way, in the others individuals.

1.1. The PDL : the self-confidence of responsible individuals at the service of a « modern » world

The vision of the world inspired by Protestantism is supported by three pillars – freedom of conscience, possessive individualism and participative democracy - at the service of a common value – the hope of progress. These values define the contribution of Reform to “Modernity” (Bauberot, 1987, p. 14). By rendering individuals equally responsible for the accomplishment of these values, Reform transforms them into *homo aequalis* (Dumont, 1977). In this way it imposes upon each individual the duty of being confident of his own capacities (Weber, 1904, p. 139).

- *The individual in charge of his freedom of conscience*

This vision of the world reposes upon the principle of the absolute freedom of conscience of the individual as defined by “the protestant”: “*I believe neither in the Pope nor councils alone...my conscience has been taken captive by the Word of God, and I am neither able nor willing to recant, since it is neither safe nor right to act against conscience. May God help me*” (Luther, Diet of Worms, 1521, in Bauberot, p. 7). This freedom of conscience is applied via direct relations with a transcendent God, unique and absolute, which owes its existence to the *three sola: sola Dei, sola scriptura, sola gratia* (Chaunu, 1975). All men live permanently under the regard of God; only God can save thanks to his arbitrary grace, which is independent of all good deeds; each man is confronted alone by his fears of redemption by his direct interpretation of Scriptures (Weber, 1904, p. 129). Because being self-confident appears as a symptom of salvation, individual has to be self-confident, living with other individuals also self-confident. If they are not, that would mean individual are not able to face with their freedom of conscience and to live with other individuals also able to do so.

- *The individual, owner of his life, his freedom, his possessions*

This freedom of conscience determines the second pillar, the right to ownership, giving birth to “possessive individualism” (Dumont, 1977, p. 74-75). Thus the English XVIIth century Levellers revendicated their right to “their lives, their freedom, their possessions”: “*Men enter society for ‘the mutual preservation of their lives, freedoms and possessions, that which I would call, in general*

terms, ownership” (Locke 1689-1690 in Bauberot, p. 80). The correlation between ownership and the rights of individuals can be seen in the *Magna Carta* (1215), the *Bill of Rights* (1689) and the American Declaration of Independence (5th Amendment, 1791). That means individual is recognized as the only owner of himself, not only his identity, but also his life, his liberties, and the fruits of his work. This extensive concept of individuality ensures some effectiveness to self-confidence: how to feel self-confident if the individual is not rooted on a guaranteed pre-eminence over all other rights, especially collective ones?

- *The individual, equal member in participative democracy*

Freedom of conscience associated with the right to ownership determines the third pillar of this reasoning: *participative democracy*. Given that individuals are born free and equal and are the owners of the fruits of their labour, all collective decisions implicitly involve them in an equal manner : “...true asceticism is always ‘hostile towards authority’... the ‘reversal’ of this principle (obeyance) in protestant asceticism forms the historical basis of the intrinsic character of contemporary democracy in societies influenced by Puritanism, in contrast to societies ‘of a Latin mindset’” (Weber, 1904, p. 182). This is incarnated by synodal-presbyterian institutions: the autonomy of autonomous churches, the election of the minister, a balance of power between elders, deacons and ministers, collective discussions within the synods which reach a consensus in the form of “confessions”: “As we are all priests... and that we have one faith only, one evangel, one sacrament, how could we not have the power to appreciate and judge right from wrong in the domain of faith?” (Luther, 1520, p. 116).

- *The individual, steward of the divine plan*

These three pillars focused around one cornerstone, designated by the term ‘progress’. This is not a naive faith in “progressivism” but an obliged faith in the divine plan: “God gave us the power not to lose, but to enrich Christianity” (Paul, Cor. 10, 8). Who would consider himself able to ignore these words?” (Luther, 1520, p. 119). This does not mean placing our hopes in « a better tomorrow », but in daring to hope for an all-powerful God for eternity. Thus History, up until now decadent and repetitive, creates room for the idea of progress (Bauberot, 1987, p. 50). All actions in conformity with divine law – exchanges, production, innovation, profit, relations, organisation -, reflect the glory of God of which man must be the scrupulous and methodical steward (Weber, 1904, p. 211). The individualistic self-confidence extent to her acts, not only her feelings, which testify the effectiveness of the Divine Providence.

Finally, the individual is the foundation of the PDL. He is directly responsible for his conscience, owner of indefectible rights, equal member of legitimate institutions, all of that for the God Sake. He has to trust in himself, and to live with trustworthy people.

1.2. The CDL: the whole prevails over the parts in a « classical » world view

The universe of the CDL is more difficult to reconstitute given the historical events - which were not coincidental - that have affected it, in particular the French Revolution as a paradigmatic event (Tocqueville 1856; Furet, 1978). *In fine*, a focus on French ideology, as an illustrative example of CDL societies, shows that the French Revolution and its historical prolongations appear as a secularisation of catholic ideals: “catho-secularism” (Bauberot, 1987). We find ourselves thus confronted with a two-faceted model dynamically antagonistic and indissociable. This vision is characterised by an holistic domination of the whole over the parts, the society over its members living in subjection; this domination justifies an abstract egalitarianism prohibiting any individual differentiation; society in exchange to this subjection allows an boundless liberty to individuals, liberty whom they are not responsible for; finally, the CDL makes society God’s equal, auto-proclaimed messiah of an early come back of a lost paradise.

- *An holistic domination of the society over subjects*

The CDL is founded upon the idea that the whole prevails over the parts. The origin of this idea is to be found a key philosophical quarrel of the Middle Ages. It opposed the “realists”, convinced of the reality of Ideas – the platonician and aristotelian Universals -, to the “nominalists” for whom only the individual exists. This ongoing quarrel over “holism” and “individualism” (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 129), ended in France by the condemnation of March 7 1277 of one hundred and nineteen “nominalist” errors by bishop Tempier of Paris (Chaunu, 1975, p. 97). Whereas a realist willingly sacrifices the subjects for the State, for Duns Scott (1266–1308), then Guillaume d’Ockham (1290–1349), common wealth is the sum of individual interests, each thing being « individual in law » (Chaunu, 1975, pp. 123-128). The Universal Roman Church, the Absolute Monarchy, the French Revolution, and the Totalitarianisms of which it is the matrix (Furet, 1978), each political regime claims divine attributes linked to the cult of the State instated by Rome (Renan, 1882, p. 315).

In such logic, the individual does not come first, but is subordinated to the society, either as a faithful part of an organic body, the Church; or simultaneously a citizen, subject and administered, dependent on the State. In this way the French Revolution concretises the project of full centralisation dreamed of and enforced during several centuries by Absolute Monarchy (Tocqueville, 1856). Motto for motto: from “One king, one law, one faith” to “the Republic, one, indivisible and secular”. This “Religion of the State” (Rosanvallon, 1990) is the reverse image of roman centralisation based on pontifical infallibility. In the CDL, the public interest prevails over personal interests, sovereign rights over those of citizens, public law over private law, under the name of the General Will (Rousseau, 1762, p. 68), so difficult to interpret and capture.

- *An abstract egalitarianism prohibiting any individual differentiation*

The second pole is found in revolutionary *egalitarianism* as a reverse image of the divine *hierarchisation* of the catholic religious body. The Church, in the form of mystical union, makes the function prevailing over the person: each person is defined by his hierarchically specific statute, child or father or mother, bachelor or married, laic or religious, in (secularist religious) or out (regular religious) the human society, this up to the pope (Cholvy, 1991, p. 46). This society of orders prevails over all other considerations, economic in particular (Le Roy Ladurie, 1969, p. 355). Against these “necessary” hierarchies, revolutionary egalitarianism does its utmost to destroy systematically all traces of social differentiation based upon orders, statutes, corporations, family situation, and by the way, economical and social positions (Preamble of the Constitution of September 3 1791). Its conception aims to re-establish *natural equality* between individuals, a primitive equality which characterised men before they were obliged to engage themselves in a wicked Social Contract (Rousseau, 1762, p. 53).

Nevertheless, *in fine*, this abstract egalitarianism goes back to the primitive equality which characterises all believers faced with God. Catho-secularism offers to fulfil this ideal by reducing the individual to his smallest common denominator (“child of God”), by going as far as to prohibit any differentiation by which the individual is intrinsically an owner (Article 1 Declaration on the Rights of Man and the Citizen, 1789). However, as one cannot go without the other, French society subsumes this egalitarianism legitimating solidly rooted privileges of a “Noblesse d’Etat” (State Nobility) (Bourdieu, 1979), fascinating by the “Société de cour” (Court Society) (Elias, 1969), obsessed by social “Distinction” (Bourdieu, 1989). This is fulfilled in the name of its “Honour” - more than in the virtue of obedience to one law for all - values of a society fixed in statutes comparable to those of Indian castes (Iribarne, 1989, p. 28).

- *Boundless individualism of individual subjection*

The conjunction of the domination of the whole over the parts and abstract egalitarianism leads to *boundless individualism*, a figure ago-antagonist of the *faithful* within the Universal Church. Troelsch (Weber, 1905, p. 204) distinguishes sect and church from a sociological viewpoint: the sect is a voluntary group of people sharing the same belief in their own salvation; the church integrates all the faithful, believers or not, saved by principle, even independently of their own will. So if “one is born a catholic, one becomes a protestant” (Bauberot, 1987). Boundless individualism subsumes catholic principles: in one way, the individual is totally free to use his life as he sees fit; in exchange, whatever he does or wants, he belongs consubstantially to the Church – Kingdom/Republic, Nation/Homeland – that is to say the State, without being able to exist outside of it (Rosanvallon, 1990). In this sense, the individual is absolutely free to do whatever he wishes, but he never belongs to himself, in a complicity between “anarchising individualism and centralising bureaucracy” (Crozier, 1970).

- *God's equal societies dedicated to promethean paresis*

Can catho-secular convergence also be seen in their common dream? Certainly, Catholicism presents itself as a rampart of immemorial divine order. Symmetrically the revolutionary will to “purge the past” in order to “found a regenerated order” by creating “new men” thanks to a “purification” of the social body via the elimination of the “henchmen of infamous superstitions” inherited from “gothic ages” (Furet, 1978, p. 105). Effectively, these two visions resemble one another by the radicalism of their projects. Faced with this irreducible clash, catholic societies have no alternative but the “Revolution against the Counter-Revolution” (Michelet, 1847-1853). Catholic societies are “revolutionary” for lack of having been “reformed”, in other words of being capable of “Reformation” as a regenerescent revival (Séguy, 1955).

Nevertheless, once again can be seen a deep identity in their common ends: a return to the lost Paradise, which corresponds to the etymology of the word ‘Revolution’ (*revolutio=return*). Revolutionary obsession, behind the cult of the Supreme Being, Reason or Progress, is once again to return to “the state of nature”. This eschatological dream renews catholic nostalgia for a return of the lost paradise which saves men who have been corrupted by society (Furet, 1995, p. 28). In this context even the issue of salvation by Christ or Man can be relativised (Cholvy, 1998, p. 223). The exaltation of the promethean will of man guided by Reason and Progress draws its ultimate conclusions from the divine humanization of Christ (Freud, 1939). God and Man shall be one in the next parousie, on earth well before in heaven.

In synthesis, theses « spirits » bring to incommensurable differences between the « modernity » of the PDL in opposition to the “classical” universe of the CDL (Iribarne, 2006, p. 269 “Will we ever be modern?”). In the PDL, everything reposes upon the responsibility of the individual to follow what he thinks is the right path in all conscience; in the CDL, the Society prevails over its members in subjection, exonerating individuals of their responsibilities. In the CDL, the individual’s life, freedoms and possessions are his own within a system of functional government (Bauberot, 1987, p. 13); in the CDL, egalitarian obsession and State religion make them hunger for honour and stature, the French Revolution being interpreted as the fact of giving each individual the right to arrogate Titles of Nobility. In the PDL the individual is at the service of obligatory hope in an indisputable divine plan; in the CDL they dream of a return to the state of nature in which man cannot be corrupted by society. The relationship between individual and trust is completely opposed: individual is the owner of his own trust in PDL, individuals are not responsible for their trust in CDL. The meaning given to individual freedom cannot be the same according to these logics.

2. Two relationship between individual and freedom: *Servo arbitrio* to good (PDL) vs. *Libero arbitrio* accepting wrongs (CDL)

We are aware of the reactions face to these trial constructions. For example, Scandinavian societies are often characterised by the fact that “individuals are subordinated to the group” and Latin societies by “absolute individualism”. These paradoxes can be explained by comparing what each of these universes means by “freedom” of the individual. Whilst bearing in mind that “*Barriers in matters of culture (bildung) and taste are the most interiorised and the most insurmountable of all differences in social statute*” (Weber, 1915-1920, p. 453).

Any phenomenon of trust is fundamentally inter-individual. It is the manner in which each conceives how an individual is likely to behave “*on average*” which determines his behaviour vis-a-vis other individuals and inversely. The totality of these inter-individual anticipations determines the collective behaviour in which trust is the result (Weber, 1922, p. 60). Thus this behaviour is founded upon the idea that each person has of the use of his “freedom” (Iribarne, 2006, pp. 21-54). Two radically opposed conceptions of “freedom” lead to two antagonistic behavioural patterns between the PDL and the CDL: subservience to good (*servo arbitrio*) characterising the PDL and free will liberated from evil (*libero arbitrio*) in the CDL (Weber, 1904, p. 96).

2.1. A defiant subservience to good according to the PDL (*servo arbitrio*)

The initial postulation of the PDL vis-a-vis the individual is “*absolute defiance*”. Hence the paradox of *a priori* defiance in *high trust value* countries remarked by numerous authors (Usunier, 2000). The religious concepts resulting from the Reform justify this absolute defiance towards the individual. They lead despite everything to typically protestant “active pessimism” (Bauberot, 1987). This apparent contradiction stems from a conception of freedom founded upon *servo arbitrio*: man is truly free only if he does good; a sinner could not know freedom (Luther, 1520).

- *Man as an eternal sinner loses his free will*

According to Protestantism, man, the eternal sinner, has no free will: “*By falling into sin, man has irremediately lost his capacity to wish for any kind of spiritual goodness linked to his salvation*” (*Confessions of Westminster (1647)*, in Weber, 1904, p. 124-125). To *De Libero arbitrio* written by Erasmus at the instigation of Rome (in exchange for the possibility of being nominated Bishop), Luther responds by his preferred book, *De servo arbitrio* (1524): the freedom of a Christian consists of recognising the powerlessness of his will by affirming that faith is always a free gift from God. Beyond the refusal to confuse Christian freedom with free will, Luther refuses to mix Christian freedom with national and political freedom, proving that neither aristocratic nationalism or rural “socialism”, nor Christian humanism would overlap his gospel (Stauffer, 1972, p. 925). Thus it is inconceivable to trust a deeply corrupt individual “at war with everyone” (Hobbes, 1651, p. 224). Not surprisingly, this pessimistic vision of man compels PDL societies to a deep individual and inter-individual self-control.

- *Disenchantment linked to the absence of salvation by good deeds*

This “pessimistic individualism” (Weber, 1904, p. 131) is reinforced by the refusal of salvation by good deeds at the origin of the ninety-five theses of Wittenberg (1517). Man cannot buy salvation from God, according to the founding interpretation of Paul’s epistles by Luther (Luther, 1520.) No salvation via “good charitable work”, donations, heritage and pious foundations; nor from the sacrament of confession because “no man may engage the word of God”; or expiatory pilgrimages to sacred sites, suppressed as being superstitious; or, even worse, by paying for “indulgence”, as is still done in the catholic church. Only the concordance of Grace, given by God (*sola gratia*) – “*it is the Holy Spirit which gives life; man alone can achieve nothing*” (John, 6-63) -,

and Faith (*sola fide*) – “He who’s faith is just in the eyes of God shall live” (Paul, Romans, 1-17). This “disenchantment” (*Entzauberung*) (Weber, 1905, p. 129) contributes to the emergence of moral autonomy; the human subject is obliged to place himself, in all responsibility, faced with the question of the truth.

- *The constant quest for signs of salvation via effectual calling*

Predestination linked to Calvinism imbibes protestant logic (Weber, 1904, p. 124). If “*The spirit shall go where it will*” (John, 3-8) and if “*Many are called but few are chosen*” (Matthew, 22-14), it becomes a question of trying to recognise signs of one’s own salvation...or damnation. By a systematic examination of conscience (*Selbstkontrolle*), each individual finds himself placed before the alternative at all moments: chosen or damned (Weber, 1904, p. 143)? Faith is attested to by objective results in order to constitute solid foundations of *certitudo salutis*. Each man must be *fides efficax*, just as the call (*Berufung*) of salvation must be an effectual calling (Weber, 1904, p. 141). All personal and social existence is marked by ethical responsibility. This profane life must show signs of its belonging to God, to his “legal promises” and to his law. By his life, one must recognise the grace of God which acts upon us and show oneself grateful, and by showing its fruits. It is “for the greater glory of God” that all things are and must be done. It is in this way that the believer embarks upon the road of sanctification (*Dictionary of ethics and moral philosophy*, Calvin, p. 202).

2.2. Confident free will devoid of evil according to the CDL (*libero arbitrio*)

According to the CDL the individual also suffers from original sin. But his downfall is by no means irremediable. Not only can a man be saved by himself, he is automatically saved, whatever he does. Did God not create him in his image, thus dotted with will, freedom and goodness? In this way, he is not *obliged* to imperatively follow divine prescriptions; he *may* follow them, if he wishes, in absolute freedom. This freedom is automatically absolute seeing as, whatever he does, a man is automatically saved by an infinitely loving and merciful God. Never would God have taken so much trouble to create a man capable of losing himself by doing evil! So the CDL man disposes not only of his full, entire and absolute free will but, on top of that, this free will is *a priori* naturally good, and if by chance he is not good, he may be absolutely certain that he will be saved.

- *A moral of intention and not of acts*

Inevitably, whatever he thinks, whatever he does, whatever he may want, the catho-secularist is saved. Of course, any individual is liable to make a few mistakes, some more serious than others. First exoneration: they are not mistakes if they were *involuntary* infractions, not committed deliberately. Children and naive or ignorant individuals are not punished (Pascal, 1657, p.71-83). Even if “No-one can say he did not know the law”, it is impossible given the complexity, contradictions and disputability of the prescriptions. Concerning the very rare *voluntary* mistakes, everything depends not on their effects, but the purity of their intentions (Pascal, 1657, p. 114). Catho-secular morality is not a morality of acts; it is a *morality of intention*. Let us suppose that an act has positive consequences, if it is done by “interest” (Smith, 1776, p. 82), this success is not recognised. On the other hand, if the act has negative consequences, but is the result of “good intention”, such as the honour due to his social rank (Iribarne, 2006, p. 96), then the individual cannot but be pardoned. This absolution is not necessarily divine; it is guaranteed to the point where it is not even necessary to solicit it from anyone.

- *The guarantee of absolution by sincere repentance*

There may sometimes be a few acts deliberately committed with bad intentions, (almost) always imposed by an exterior constraint. As the individual is naturally good, the evil can only come

from an exterior source that is the Society. But, happily, his pardon may come at any time, up to and including the eve of his death (Ariès, 1975). It is possible for him, at any moment, to prove his “deep and sincere repentance” in order to receive the pardon of another. The fact of freely acknowledging his mistake has enormous and far-reaching effects: “A mistake admitted is a mistake half pardoned”. It must be remembered that it is badly seen, if not more, that someone refuses to pardon he who has admitted his mistake (however big!). Is not God himself Pardon and Mercy (Compte-Sponville, 2006)? Not to accord a man who has killed his wife, son and child the pardon he solicits, if he is a *posteriori* a sincere repentant, condemns more surely the victim than the assassin.

- *The salvation deal using a debit/credit current bank account*

There may, exceptionally, remain extremely rare cases of deliberate mistakes. This entails big responses to big issues. That signifies the Confession by means of which the penitent obtains the absolution granted by the priest according to the sacred formula “*ego te absolvo filii*” (Cholvy, 2001). This absolution is obtained in exchange for complementary penitence ranging from the smallest up to the biggest (pilgrimage, donation, vows). In extreme moments, it was – and it still is – the tradition to “settle your debt with God”, confession always preceding Extreme Unction. Max Weber talks about “a debit/credit current bank account” with which the individual readies himself to present himself on the Last Day of Judgement with a balance between his “good” actions and the “bad” (Weber, 1905, p. 146). And this to demonstrate, with a bargain, that when all’s said and done and when everything has been weighed up, the few “good” actions done – particularly *in extremis* – more than compensate, and that which appears *ex post* as being insignificant errors of no importance (Pascal, 1657, p. 144).

- « *We shall all go to heaven* »

This final bargain is nevertheless not truly useful in most cases. Does not even the most heinous sinner who repents with his dying breath magnify God’s greatness even more than one thousand faithful who obey the law all their lives? “*In the Kingdom of God, the last shall be the first*” (Luke, 13-30). So why do we even need exterior sacraments if the judgement of his conscience alone is enough (Iribarne, 1989)? So the catho-secularist individual does not really know where the frontier is between good and evil (WVS in Boudon, 2002). God has become absent in their consciences as being the image of a great and distant Architect, universally benevolent and merciful (WVS in Boudon, 2002). He is, himself, and only himself, uniquely responsible for his conscience, before himself only, and he does not believe in heaven or less of all, in hell (WVS in Boudon, 2002). He knows that all men are good and obligatorily saved, even if he refuses to be. He is intrinsically not responsible for his acts, assured of infinite and merciful pardon from God, and thus from men. Latin “Moral Freedom” – the people of free will according to Weber (1904) – is no more the price to pay for the absolute certainty of salvation whose feigned indifference is no more than the obvious symptom. The need for salvation is indifferent because one – and men – is always saved, seeing as it is never possible to affirm the possibility that one may be damned. “We shall all go to Heaven” assures the repeated chorus of a famous French song.

In terms of a synthesis, the different meaning given to freedom by PDL vs. CDL explain that “*forms of economic organisation which appear identical can conciliate themselves with a highly differing economic ethic and they then produce very different historical effects according to the particularities of the ethic*” (Weber, 1915-1920, p. 332). PDL freedom, founded on pessimistic subservience concerning human salvation transforms the individual into a “slave of good” (*servus*); CDL freedom, starting from a postulate of the infinite goodness of man created in the image of God, exonerates man from all evil. But, these differences do not explain the paradox of trust/defiance contained in each of these logics: how, starting with a pessimistic postulate on human nature, does the PDL manage to install trust? Inversely, how, starting from an optimistic base for the individual, does the CDL arrive at defiance?

3. Relationship between individual and individuals, the trust/control paradoxes: trust based on control (PDL) vs. trust excluding control (CDL)

We understand the difference between “subservient” and “free will” countries (Weber, 1904, p. 96): moral conformism here, moral licence between the North and the South of Europe. But how does one explain the paradox between trust and control – that means the relationship between individual and individuals - that have been documented by numerous authors (Usunier, 2000)? The PDL’s own paradox may be expressed as follows: how can profound defiance *ex ante* allow one to have strong *ex post* trust? Inversely, the CDL’s paradox can be summed up thus: how can unlimited *a priori* trust lead to generalised *a posteriori* defiance? How does one understand that the PDL’s opportunistic postulate leads to solid trust tendencies, which we will call “defiant trust”; whereas the CDL’s pre-conceived idea of trust leads to deeply-rooted defiance, which we shall call “defiant defiance”?

To solve these paradoxes we need a concept indissociable of trust: control. It is by the filter of control that individuals determine the degree of trust to place in other individuals. The PDL/CDL trust/control dialectic allows the resolution of the trust/defiance paradox: control is the base of trust for the PDL; trust excludes control in the CDL. Control is a pre-requisite for the first, and an insult for the second. But trust remains the aim of controls in the PDL, whereas control is explained by and justifies defiance in the CDL.

These two conceptions, which make control the basis of trust in the PDL and the proof of defiance in the CDL, are partially explained by beliefs of a religious nature. In the PDL, man’s defiance obliges permanent individual and collective self-control; in the CDL, all control pertaining to social activity is seen as undermining man’s natural goodness.

3.1 .Control as an antidote to opportunism according to the PDL

Control is at the heart of the PDL. Protestant Reform is defined as a generalised individualisation of control. Control of individuals over their own lives, and, by extension, the control of individuals over other things, and, beyond that, the control of individuals between themselves. This process of “rationalisation” (Weber, 1904, p. 154) initiated by Protestantism is what founded *homo oeconomicus* man (Weber, 1904, p. 216). It has implemented too in political and social life (Gauchet, 1985).

- *From self-control to control of one’s life*

The individual must control himself using strict, permanent and rigorous mastery of his own emotions and actions of which he must be wary: “*Those who depend upon their own nature cannot please God*” (Paul, Romans, 8-8.) This control is applied to passion in order to affirm his domination of instinct by human reasoning (Weber, 1904, p. 153). To this composure may be added control over his acts, judged according to formal respect of *Uprightness* or *Ehrlichkeit* laws, and not according to their implicit or explicit intentions. This “rationalisation” of individual life, that of the PDL, originates from the question asked at each moment of the conscience of all: “saved or damned?” with only one negative act being enough to ensure eternal damnation (Bunyan, *in* Weber, 1904, p. 146).

Via self-control (*selbskontrolle*), individuals must control their own lives taking into account the value which is given to them: “*Thousands of years had to pass before you came into being, and thousands more years are waiting in silence for what you shall do with your life*” (Thomas Carlyle, *in* Weber, 1919, p. 82). Thus movement from extra-world individualism to intra-world individualism (Dumont, 1977, p.23) leads to “methodically rationalised ethical conduct” (Weber, 1904, p. 154), which is the source of a “systematic and rational shaping of the whole of moral life” (Weber, 1904,

p. 156). To illustrate this, one of the major differences between the PDL and the CDL resides in the sentiment of controlling one's life : less than 40% of the French or Italians say that they "dispose of choice and control of one's life", against more than 60% of Swedish and more than 80 % of Americans (WVS in Boudon, 2002).

- *From extended control over the environment to social auto control*

Accomplishment in this world of one's duty corresponds to a "vocation" (*beruf*) which is implicated in all acts of collective life. The great mutation of values initiated by the Reform resides, even today, in "*This distinctive idea – so familiar to us today, but in reality so little obvious – that duty is accomplished by having a job, a profession (Berufspflicht), is the characteristic idea of the 'social ethic' of capitalist civilisation. In one way, it is its foundation*" (Weber, 1904, p. 69). In all circumstances, the accomplishment of temporal duties is the only way to live which will please God; all legal work forms have the same value before God (Weber, 1904, p. 106). From this, over the whole extent of the puritanical conception of existence – profit, saving, investment, accumulation, donation -, this conception has favoured the tendency towards a more economically rationalised life. For example, work allows "the 'realisation of something' for 80% of Swedes and 70% of Americans, against less than 50% of Italians and 40% of the French (WVS in Boudon, 2002).

This control over one's personal life is carried out under the vigilant eye of the group which gives value to the individual. Protestant reform considers that communities of believers must consist exclusively of an assembly of personally regenerated, if not 'born again' (John, 3-3) faithful. Responsibility for the fact that "God's glory" is not stained by the participation of someone who obviously displays the signs of damnation falls upon each person in the community group (Weber, 1904, p. 180). This auto-control, so strong in PDL countries – personal freedom and the respect for the freedom of others – is translated by a differentiated perception of the rules: 60% of Americans say that one must "always obey instructions", 50% of Swedes, 30% of the French, 25% of Italians (WVS in Boudon, 2002). From whence come different perceptions of "interest in politics" as a collective rule: 50% of Americans, 40% of Swedes, 30% of the French, 25% of Italians are interested in (WVS in Boudon, 2002).

In terms of synthesis, the PDL trust/control paradox is explained by the constraint of trust linked to the obligation of control. Born a sinner, the individual has to control his life, things, and others; his existence manifesting his control, trust must be placed in him, as a member, always under the control of others. Thus men are lost when "*They are not conscientious and do not keep their promises*" (Paul, Romans, 1-31). Trust is based upon control of which trust is the aim. PDL trust is an output, a "defiant trust", but if there through an embedded *habitus*, a strong one.

3.2. The society of defiance as a deception vis-a-vis the loss of the natural goodness of a man in the CDL

The paradox of the CDL's trust is the following: how, starting from an assumption of trust in human nature, does one develop generalised defiance? This paradox is explained by the relations that the CDL has with control. Man being defined as naturally good, he cannot be held responsible for the "mystery of evil". Hence the wariness, if not rejection upon the ultimate cause of evil, life in society, represented by work or social rules. The logic of Honour remains the only guide which permits the individual to decide, using his own free will, what is good or bad for himself first.

- *The "mystery of evil" inadmissible for a naturally good man*

The CDL assumes a positive aspect to man, as much according to catholic conceptions of a Golden age before original sin, as according to the beliefs of Light of "man in a state of nature" uncorrupted by "political society" (Dumont 1977, p. 52). This cult of Nature – the universe is

reduced to “*one unique act and one great truth: the laws of nature*” (d’Alembert, *Discours préliminaire de l’Encyclopédie*, 1750) – rejoins, in this legend, engraved at the Pantheon, a secular church dedicated “to its Great Men by a grateful Republic”: “*Nature giving the Declaration of Human Rights to France*”. The contrast between these positive, even naive, postulates, and the reality of the “mystery of evil” leads to a “society of defiance” specific to the CDL (Algan & Cahuc, 2007). Thus only 22% of the French declare that “as a general rule, one should trust others” against 33% of Italians, 56% of Americans and 66% of Swedes (WVS in Algan & Cahuc, 2007). This generalised defiance extends to all activities, not just political – power, justice, parliament – and social – unions – but also economic (WVS in Algan & Cahuc, 2007). Irremediably, the Society has perverted the individual human nature.

- *Work between suffering and torture*

The essential cause of Society’s intrinsic ills resides in the obligation to work with all of its corollaries – money, competition, markets. All schoolchildren learn that the word work comes from *tripalium*, an “instrument of torture” which helped women to give birth. For greco-latin countries, which colonised CDL countries two thousand years ago, work, a servile task, was reserved for slaves, as the statute of free man did not allow him to work. French nobility imposed an absolute interdiction to work under threat of “derogation” and losing one’s title. An interdiction which manifests itself by the scorn which is heaped upon the “bourgeois”, from Moliere up until today: CDL societies having never succeeded in creating a true bourgeoisie with a capitalist mindset (Furet, 1995, p. 24). On the contrary, there is a positive image of the “man of private means”: more than 50% of the French and almost 60% of Italians agree that people should be obliged to retire earlier, against 10% of Swedes and 20% of Americans (WVS in Boudon, 2002). Or, again, 40% of the French consider that “men have more of a right to work than women” compared to 15% of Swedes (WVS in Boudon, 2002).

- *The rejection of economic impurity*

The CDL has globally remained on the sidelines of the fundamental ideological change initiated by the Reform. The “classical” idea expressed from the beginning in the scorn for the engineer expressed by Socrates, or the condemnation of commerce by Aristotle, is to consider that in the exchange, the advantage of one partner obligatorily results in loss for the other. The CDL also finds it difficult to consider exchange as being beneficial to both parties, a fundamental change blocking its accession to the market economy (Dumont, 1977, p. 45). In general terms, the economic conceptions of the CDL are contained in three concepts. The first foundation according to Rousseau is autarkic: exchange must be reduced, and most of all, so should the quantity and the role played by money. Prosperity is not wealth, and abundance is worth more than opulence. Social distinctions and honours are indispensable, but the inequality between rich and poor is bad. Technical progress is to be banned and the growth of wealth can but reduce the population (Dumont, 1977, p. 64-65). For the second concept, physiocratic as well as mercantilist, the economy can only be at the service of the State (Dumont, 1977, p. 44). The third believes in spontaneous harmony such as the table of economic exchange presented by Quesnay, a holistic which projects upon the economic picture a conception of the universe as being an ordained whole (Dumont, 1977, p. 51). We are far here from the “God bless this trade” (Weber, 1904) engraved above the doors of protestant merchants, or the “interest well included” of Adam Smith (1776)!

- *‘Distinctive’ collective rules regulated by honour*

The difficulties concerning the formal respect of collective rules are understandable : only 40% of French people questioned declare that « claiming public money to which one does not have the right can never be justified » compared to 80% of Swedish and 70% of Italians or Americans (WVS in Algan & Cahuc, 2007). The same goes for the tolerance of stealing or tax evasion, or

“having a good salary” not being a goal for 50% of them (WVS in Boudon, 2002). The totality of this data is correlated with the absence of egalitarianism and universalism of social regimes faced with corporatist protectionism as well as, last but not least, weak self-esteem measured using pride in national identity (WVS in Boudon, 2002).

So what are the “psychic benefits” which hold individuals together within the CDL? According to Philippe d’Iribarne (1989, 2006), French attitudes – and by extension those of the CDL – are guided by Honour. Thus the French Revolution generalised the privileges of the nobility more than it democratised the rights of people. Beyond the intrinsic virtue of the democratic regime and the glory characterised by the monarchist regime, the definition of Honour specific to aristocratic regimes, according to Montesquieu, explains the absolute freedom of CDL individuals to define their own eminently variable rules:

“...honour, that is to say the prejudice of each person and condition....this virtue which one owes less to others than what we owe to oneself...not so much that which draws us towards our fellow citizen than that which distinguishes us from them....We do not judge the actions of men as good, but as wonderful, as just, but as grand, as reasonable, but as extraordinary....This bizarre honour means that virtues are not worth what it is, nor as what it wants: it takes on for itself rules for everything which is forbidden to us: it hangs over or insists upon our duty according to its desires, whatever their sources in religion, be they in morals or in politics” (Montesquieu (1748), *L’esprit des lois*, in Iribarne, 1986, p. 59).

In terms of synthesis, “promises do not oblige in any way when one has no intention of obliging oneself to fulfil them. But it hardly ever happens that we have that intention unless we confirm it by serment or by contract. In such a way that when we simply say: I will do it, we mean that we will do it if our will does not change. Because we cannot deprive ourselves of freedom” (Pascal, 1657, p. 151). From where we obtain the absolute rejection of any idea of *control* seen as being ingequence: control is used to state an offensive lack of trust in someone who we judge as being incapable of fulfilling the duty of his “state” himself (Iribarne, 1989).

Conclusion: Trust in the IMP Group, evidence or avoidance?

Each shall judge this trial construction of two models of a *Protestant Dominant Logic* and a *Catholic Dominant Logic*, inevitably neither correct or true. These “ethos” influence trust through three modalities : the responsibility of the individual is the basis of his self-trust, whereas the domination of the individual by the whole exonerates him of all responsibility; the freedom given to an individual originates from the subservience obliging the doing of good, whereas free will sees in the absence of evil the confirmation of that freedom; control is the condition of trust, which is its goal, whereas defiance sees in control the confirmation of an impossible trust.

According to Usunier (2000), trust was not developed by the IMP group. We need to know if the reason for this evidence - or avoidance - is linked to the fact that the IMP Group is marked by a Protestant Dominant Logic. These cultural foundations would explain its difficulty to further develop the concept according to the principles of axiological neutrality, as well as the limits of its acculturation to other cultural environments.

Without analysing the entirety of ‘IMP historical’ works (Hakansson, 1982; Tunrull & Valla, 1986; Ford, 1990; Axelsson & Easton, 1992; Hakansson & Snehota, 1995), its founding book (Hakansson, 1982) does not seem to have placed trust at the foundations of the model of interaction. On the contrary, the conflictual relationships within the manufacturing-distribution channels are retained as the basis of reflection: « *the conflicts between different levels and within levels in the*

channel as well as the patterns of power and communication which exists between them » (ibid. p. 11.) In the same way, transaction costs (Coase, (1929) and Williamsonian opportunism (Williamson, 1975) constitute one of the contributions of reference: “*man is not just characterized by bounded rationality but also by opportunism (‘self-seeking interest with guile’) and this makes markets operate inefficiently when there is an imbalanced dependence between the parties* » (Håkansson, 1982, p. 12).

In practical terms, trust appears as being one of the outputs of the interactions between the parties: “*transactions do not take place in an attitudinally neutral setting; the establishment of satisfying exchange relations (an ‘atmosphere’) modifies and is modified by the transactions*” (Håkansson, 1982, p. 12). Trust, although present everywhere, never appears as an action variable in its entirety. Strictu sensu, the model of interaction is not founded on trust. On the contrary, it expresses an obsession with mutual control : « *there are checks on the opportunism in markets, e.g. courtesy, the interest in establishing conditions for future business and the effects of a firm’s reputation in business deals with others*” (Håkansson, 1982, p. 12). The main assumption of the authors resides in the fact that the transaction costs can be reduced by controls (checks) and behaviour (attitudinal setting) giving rise to intermediary forms between the company and the market.

In the IMP model, trust can only come from control; but can control exist without trust? To this question, the authors respond implicitly that trust is the aim of exchanges: “*Many aspects of the agreements between buying and selling firms are not fully formalized nor based on legal criteria. Instead, the relationship is based on mutual trust*” (Håkansson, 1982, p. 17). This unsolved paradox between trust and control – if it is not the original sin – could explain the limits of the concept of trust within the IMP.

Thus a majority of the contributions consider trust as being taken for granted: « *Research in inter-organizational relationships since early 1990’s has consistently argued that mutual trust is an essential factor of relationship quality and performance* » (Seppänen, Blomqvist & Sundqvist, 2002). The majority of these contributions come from researchers who share the dominant culture of the IMP network for which trust goes without saying and which is “naturally” the aim of all interactions. Are these researchers betraying the original thoughts of the founders? Or, on the contrary, are they not expressing more spontaneously than their founding fathers a conception of trust specific to the PDL? That, for example, founded upon a « *social system perspective* » defined as « *a social process which evolves to facilitate the society’s needs for efficient and effective exchange of values* » (Håkansson, 1982, p. 11).

This specific PDL conception considers trust as being good and that it goes without saying in as far as a free man cannot explicitly wish to do harm. Thus control is at the service of trust and trust is the desirable aim of control. Let us imagine an inverse postulate. For example, if individuals gain “psychic benefit” (Weber, 1904) from practising opportunism, does the model of interaction lose its meaning? Let us suppose that the major interest of the model of interaction resides in its capacity to better control the other party by being controlled by it the least possible. That it permits to maximise the asymmetries of information in favour of one party in order to increase its freedom of manoeuvre whilst imposing constraints on the other party. That it authorises a complete update of the strategy of others without ever giving an idea of its own, except for its strong points but never its weak points (Crozier, 1970). This is in conformity with one of the key assumptions of the founders of the IMP: « *such an increase in control improves the firm’s chances of forecasting and determining a part of his environment* » (Håkansson, 1982, p. 21). Would the spirit of the model of interaction not be betrayed? Or at the very least, would it be respected?

A more thorough analysis of the 39 contributions available on the IMP site under the heading « trust » confirms the difficulties of acculturation of the IMP approach. These limits appear when

searchers try to operationalize the “defiant trust” specific to a PDL face to ‘inconvenient facts’: difficult universalist conceptualisations (commitment, psychological contracts, interpersonal, information), taking in account opportunistic behaviour (channel) or exchange situations (one shot, temporary), dealing with cultural differences (Japan, Bali, Yugoslavia, China, Saudi Arabia...), and finally trying to understand the variety of trust, or the role of antitrust or the paradox between control in trust in situation of incertitude.

In temporary conclusion, we think the culturally marked character of a dominant PDL at the heart of the IMP Group constitutes one of the obstacles to its integration by cultures founded upon “positive” opportunism. This opportunism may not only be obliged as in the CDL, but it may equally be socially desired as a positive value in other cultures; Chinese, or those inspired by Islam (Weber, 1922). The PDL makes control the condition of trust; but this is possible because trust is the aim of control. Inversely, for the CDL as for some other cultures, defiance is the starting-point of exchange, and is most often its point of arrival; control constitutes the major lever of the maximisation of its freedom of manoeuvre and inversely the placing of constraints upon the other party (Crozier, 1970).

Thus, by a reversal of perspective, the hypothesis according to which opportunism cannot in itself be bad cannot be excluded. On the contrary, the threat of “*moral hazard*” appears as a condition of survival, and for that reason, as being often desirable in itself. In this context, a man incapable of opportunism will be judged not only as being socially inadapted, but morally deviant and, most particularly, economically inefficient (Machiavelli, 1532). Opportunist incertitude shows itself to be the unique lever of tension in the exchange. Via the maximisation of its potential for opportunism, each party in the exchange tries to stop the other from maximising the effect of position specific to all situations of political, economic or social dependence. Globally, this opportunist tension acts as a lubricant against mutual indulgence, which is morally comfortable in terms of relations, but economically inefficient in terms of transactions (Liebenstein, 1967).

Such could be one of the future options of research opened up by our trial of the comprehensive interpretation of PDL vs. CDL. Although it is not for us to judge one or the other of these logics, are we not held to take into account the “inconvenient facts” (Weber, 1919, p. 105) of trust generated by its multiple meanings according to culture? And this whilst remaining aware that “*the views most familiar to us are susceptible, for this very reason, to escape us*” (David Hume, 1875).

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