

# **Relationships, Services and the Question of Ownership**

## *A Neo-Institutional Economic Interpretation of Business Relationships in the Service Industry*

*Frank Ullrich*  
*Institute of Industrial Marketing Management,*  
*"Humboldt Universität zu Berlin",*  
*Spandauer Str. 1,*  
*D-10178 Berlin*  
*Tel.: ++49-(0)30-2093-5884,*  
*E-mail: fullrich@wiwi.hu-berlin.de*

### **Abstract**

The often mentioned but never deeply investigated service characteristic of "no transfer of ownership" is a starting point for a property-rights based foundation of business relationships in the service industry. Looking at the distribution of property-rights between customer and service provider the service exchange could be regarded as an economic relationship in the sense of a limited in time transfer of certain kinds of property-rights: "Usus", "Fructus", "Abusus". The ownership determining right of selling all these rights to third parties will remain unchanged. By including the ownership related aspect of externalities a classification of transactions can be developed that integrates the whole service sector including information related services and services provided by non-profit organisations and the government, within one theoretical concept. Therefore relationships seem to be a necessary by-product of the economic features of services in terms of a contractual relation. However, relationships in services still remain a design variable for the service provider. No transfer of complete ownership creates serious incentive problems and the problem of being "locked in" due to dedicated investments and sunk costs. Both will cause serious behavioural uncertainty and safeguarding against opportunistic behaviour induces transaction costs. In order to promote and facilitate service transactions a service provider have to choose appropriate institutional designs of governance mechanisms that mitigate these economic consequences.

### **1. Introduction**

In the literature of service marketing the importance of business relationships and the concept of Relationship Marketing have been emphasised (GRÖNROOS 1990a, LOVELOCK 1996). Moreover the evolution and development of this concept is strongly influenced by the analysis of service businesses (GRÖNROOS 1990b, GUMMESSON 1996). It is argued that the importance of relationships in services is caused by the direct interaction between buyer and seller due to the personal contact in many services. On the one hand, this conclusion is based on a management oriented marketing perspective (LOVELOCK 1988), on the other hand, the interaction approach of the "Nordic School" had already generated important implications for the marketing of services (GRÖNROOS 1990a, GUMMESSON 1996). However, a consensus on general accepted service characteristics have not been found until today (JOHNS 1999). To analyse service interaction, in this paper a theoretical perspective based on the neo-institutional economics will be applied. Although principal-agent theory (MILLS 1990) and transaction cost economics (BOWEN and JONES 1986, JONES 1990)

have already been used for analysing services, the affinity between relationships and services gets a new explanation from a property rights point of view.

## **2. An Economic Analysis of Transactions based on Property Rights**

### **2.1. Transactions, Property Rights and Externalities**

Since the beginning of the service marketing literature the service characteristic of "no transfer of ownership" is mentioned (JUDD 1964 p.58, RATHMELL 1974 p.6). However, the economic consequences for service interaction and the implication for service marketing have never been investigated further. This ownership characteristic naturally leads to the property rights theory as one stream of thinking in the neo-institutional economics. Based on ownership and property rights a comprehensive classification of Transactions can be developed.

PLINKE (2000) defines a transaction as an agreement on which conditions which kind of property rights will be transferred between two economic parties. According to ALCHIAN and WOODWARD (1988, p.66): "*a transaction includes both exchanges and contracts. An exchange is a transfer of property rights to resources that involves no promise or latent future responsibility. In contrast, a contract promises future performance, typically because one party makes an investment, the profitability of which depends in the other party's future behaviour*". These statements contain three elements for further investigation, property rights, exchanges and contracts.

#### *Property Rights*

Property rights are the legal rights to control resources. They compound the right to use a tangible or intangible asset (*usus*), the right to appropriate the returns from the asset (*usus fructus*), the right to change a good (*abusus*) (e.g. change of location, substance, appearance) and finally the most important *right to sell a good* and hereby the mentioned three other rights (RICHTER and FURUBOTN 1996). The latter one is the central right of founding complete ownership. Since these rights are valid vis-a-vis anybody, they are also called *absolute property rights* (RICHTER and FURUBOTN 1996). Ownership can be held on tangible things (incl. animals, plants), on intangible things (e.g. copyrights, patents) and also as the right of self-determination of human beings that is the right of ownership on the own person. From this perspective selling a good means an exchange where ownership will only be transferred if all the mentioned four absolute rights together are transferred to the buyer. This implies that there could also exist transactions where only one or more of the first three rights (*usus*, *fructus*, *abusus*) are *limited in time transferred* to another actor. The right of ownership and therefore the right to sell the first three rights still remain by the owner. Examples for these possibilities are renting or leasing contracts for "*usus*" and "*fructus*" and contacts of employment for "*abusus*". The limited in time transfer of these property rights are agreements which are only valid between two parties. Contractual relations that are only valid between specified actors and not absolute against anybody are therefore called *relative property rights* (RICHTER and FURUBOTN 1996). Based on this theoretical view the difference between exchanges and contracts can be exemplified.

#### *Exchanges*

In the case of a selling contract there exists a relative property right that defines the transfer of all four absolute property rights and therefore the transfer of complete ownership to the buyer. The objects for selling exist already ex-ante before settling the selling contract. This is the typical case of a pure exchange, where ownership will be transferred of already finished standardised mass products for anonymous mass markets.

### *Contracts*

On the other hand, the performance does not need exist already ex-ante but rather is produced according to contractual specifications ex-post after settling a contract. Examples would be order production, highly customised turn-key projects and services. However, contractual agreements can be differentiated more precisely align the distribution of property rights. Either, the contract specifies the order production of objects on which ex-post, after production, ownership and therefore all four property rights will be transferred. Or there could be contractual agreements where the three rights usus, fructus and abusus are only limited in time transferred to another actor, the ownership constituting right of selling the other three rights remains unchanged. Such contractual agreements could be labelled *relative property rights on other actors property*. The interesting point is that performances in reality labelled services, exactly fit to this definition. This will be shown in more detail in the next chapter. Yet, another analytical category from the property rights theory has to be discussed. Besides the cases of transfer and no transfer of ownership based on the free choice of individual actors, there exists the problem of externalities and public goods.

### *Externalities*

Externalities and public goods are reasons for market failure that are analysed in the economic literature (MANKIW 1998). In contrast to private goods pure public goods are characterised (1) by the missing possibility to exclude other actors from consumption and (2) by the missing rivalry in consumption between different actors (MANKIW 1998). These characteristics of public goods are caused by Externalities. Externalities imply that the behaviour of actors has influence on the utility of other actors without compensated, or internalised by the price mechanism of the (MANKIW 1998, RICHTER and FURUBOTN 1996). The missing internalisation of externalities is due to transaction costs of excluding other actors from the use of resources. These transaction costs encompass costs of specification, enforcement and adaptation of property rights. If these costs of exclusion are prohibitory, a complete specification of property rights on resources is impossible. This aspect is known in the literature as the attenuation of property rights or an incomplete internalisation of externalities (FURUBOTN and RICHTER 1991). Hereby incentive problems are created which means that the use of a resource cause negative or positive externalities since the user does not bear the full costs and benefits of her behaviour. The consequences are a loss in economic welfare in terms of efficiency since either too much negative externalities are produced or the incentive to generate positive externalities is failing. Therefore a trade-off exists between the internalisation of externalities which increase economic welfare and the transaction costs of specification, enforcement and adaptation of property rights. To sum up, in terms of property rights and transfer of ownership three basic categories of transactions can be identified:


1. *Exchange Transactions* that cover the exchange of ex-ante already specified and existing objects of performance with the wanted transfer of ownership as in the case of selling and buying a good. The object of exchange does exist ex-ante before the settlement of the contract.
2. *Contractual Transactions* where the performance depends on the specification within a contractual agreement and the object of performance will be produced ex-post after settlement of the contract. Either the contract contains a transfer of complete ownership as in the first category, or only certain property rights (usus, fructus, abusus) are limited in

time transferred without changing the ownership constituting right of selling the former three rights.

3. *Transactions with externalities* where the object of exchange creates positive or negative externalities. A complete specification of property rights and ownership is impossible due to prohibitory transaction costs.

## 2.2. A Classification of Transactions based on Property Rights

After identifying three basic categories for characterising transactions based on property rights, a more detailed classification with seven subsets of performances can be developed (Figure 1).



### *Exchange Transactions*

In exchange transactions where the object of performance already exists as a standardised good *ex-ante* before the settlement of the contract, two cases can be distinguished. Either the transfer of ownership is intended and also can be enforced. This kind of performance could be labelled a pure exchange good (*transaction type A*). On the other hand the transfer of ownership could be intended but property rights can't be fully assigned to an individual actor due to externalities. To show this latter case, an excursion on the characteristics of information have to be made.

Information are highly afflicted with externalities since they can be regarded as public goods. On the one hand no rivalry in consumption exists between different actors. The amount of technological or other knowledge for a certain user will not be reduced if somebody else is using it (MANKIWI 1998). Therefore information are not used up by consuming them like food or fuel. Further, there are serious peculiarities with information that can be traced back to problems of exclusion: The "buyer" of an information always gets only a copy of the information since "after buying a car, the buyer possesses the car. But if an idea is "sold", both buyer and seller do possess it" (PICOT and FRANCK 1988, p.545). Even in the case of saving information on physical media (e.g. books, CDs, Video-tapes) or by agreeing on a contractual clause of not using the sold information, the buyer always will have only a copy. The original

information or the "master copy" will remain at least in the head of the information supplier. Another exclusion related externality is the so called "information paradox" of ARROW (1974). From this perspective information can only be valued economically by a potential buyer if he know the information. When the information is known, one does not need to buy it anymore. All these problems ask for special institutions (e.g. copyrights) that allow at least for partial exclusion of consumption to promote exchange of information related performances. Another possibility to allow at least partial exclusion of other actors is to save the information on physical media. If these performances that are afflicted with externalities (e.g. books, CDs, Video-tapes) are produced in advance as standardised mass products for anonymous mass markets, one has to consider an additional subset of ex-ante existing objects. These performances could be labelled exchange goods with partial exclusion where full assignment of property is inhibited by externalities (*transaction type AC*).

### *Contractual Transactions*

In contractual transactions, the object of performance will be produced ex-post after a contractual agreement in order production according to the individual specifications of the customer. Again one can distinguish different kinds of contractual transactions according to the property rights transferred. If ownership will be transferred by selling all four property rights (usus, fructus, abusus and the right to sell all theses rights) the subset of order production of turn-key projects or highly customised products can be defined. As the result of this kind of transaction an exchange good is created (*transaction type AB*). Therefore order production of exchange goods can be considered as an hybrid type between exchange and contractual transactions. Ex-ante no performance exists and through a contract only a promise of performance is given. However, ex-post ownership will be transferred as in the case of ex-ante existing exchange goods.

On the other hand there exists the possibility that ex-post after contractual specification and production of the object of performance no ownership will be transferred. The missing ownership transfer can be explained by the intended decision of the actors, or it is caused by externalities due to technology. If the missing transfer of ownership is intended, this kind of order production can be defined as a classical service (*transaction type B*). The property rights usus, fructus and abusus will only limited in time be transferred to another actor, the right of selling all the other rights remains unchanged (e.g. transportation, banking, maintenance). Either the supplier furnish the performance on the property of the customer (abusus) as in the case of repairing or transportation. Or the performance consists of the provision of suppliers property for the customer (usus, fructus) as in the case of using sport facilities in a fitness studio. Obviously in most cases the performance on customers property and provision of suppliers property are mixed together as in the case of transportation of customer goods by using suppliers devices for transportation. This overlapping of two ownership spheres implies one economic foundation of the affinity between service interaction and relationships. This will be discussed further in the last chapter.

### *Transactions with externalities*

In contractual relations no transfer of ownership can also be caused by externalities as in the case of already mentioned exchange goods with externalities. If no rivalry in consumption exists and even no partial exclusion of consumption can be established due to prohibitory transaction costs, market failure occurs and a private production of the performance will fail. These public goods have to be produced collectively by non-profit or governmental organisations (basic R&D, defence) (*transaction type C*). If at least partial exclusion is possible, one can distinguish two other cases. Typical for order production of information

related services is the missing rivalry in consumption and incomplete exclusion of usage. However, customers might to get full ownership if it only would be possible (e.g. results of consulting, market research, developing advertising campaigns). By copying and saving the customised information on physical media and by establishing copyrights, at least partial exclusion is possible and an exchange good is created (*transaction type ABC*). If not only no rivalry in consumption exists but utility even increases with the number of users of the ex-post order produced performance, network externalities are at work. Again, if at least partial exclusion can be established by restricting usage through contracts, private suppliers will offer these network-services, like telecommunication or Internet provision (*transaction type BC*). However, these types of transactions are characterised by no transfer of ownership too. To sum up, looking on performances from the perspective of property rights it is possible to deduce the whole service sector from one theoretical concept. Even the information sector and public services from government and non-profit organisations can be integrated. Therefore the service characteristic of no transfer of ownership has proved as an useful and operable criteria for discriminating goods and services. For practical purpose however it is worth noting, that in reality most often bundles of performances are the subject of exchanges. These bundles consist of elements to distinguish along the discrete dimension of ownership and have to be combined by the marketer like molecules (SHOSTACK 1977). This leads to the implications for service marketing.

### **3. Implications for the Marketing Management of Service Interaction**

#### **3.1. Incentive Problems of Missing Ownership Transfer**

From the point of view of property rights theory, transactions with no transfer of ownership cause serious incentive problems. Until today this was mainly investigated on an organisational macro level by analysing the consequences of different distributions of property rights on the incentive structure in countries and companies: The central thesis of the property-rights view is the proposition that the particular structure of property rights in an economy influences the allocation and utilization of economic goods (resources) in specific and predictable ways (FURUBOTN and RICHTER 1991). If no full ownership on assets is transferred either due to intended or unintended incomplete specification of property rights, externalities are generated and incentive problems to use someone else assets with prevailed care will arise. Such an attenuation of property rights in an asset affects the users expectations about uses to which he can put assets, the value of the asset to the user and consequently the terms of trade (FURUBOTN and RICHTER 1991): "attenuation implies a shrinkage of economic options for the asset owner, and a corresponding reduction of the asset's value". The more precisely property rights are defined, the more the user of an asset has to bear the full consequences in terms of costs and benefits of his use of the resource. As already mentioned the interesting point is that services are characterised by no transfer of ownership and should therefore burdened by the resulting incentive problems. The problem to use the property of someone else less cautious as the own property may seem to be trivial. However, in the service literature this aspect has not been investigated yet. In both cases, as in services where the customer limited in time transfers the right of *abusus* to a service supplier, as in services where the supplier limited in time transfers the rights of *usus* or *fructus* to the customer, negative externalities may arise. The customer is in danger that her property is not treated as she would treat it herself (e.g. transportation). On the other hand the supplier has the problem that the customer will not use the assets, on which she got the limited in time transferred rights of *usus* and *fructus*, as carefully as if she would possess them (e.g. renting a car). The implications of property rights distribution on incentives and behaviour can be summarised by the following proposition:

*Proposition 1: "In transactions where complete ownership does not change but only certain property rights are only limited in time transferred to another actor either intended or due to externalities, incentive problems and therefore behavioural uncertainty will arise".*

### **3.2. Dedicated Investments and Sunk Costs**

A second consequence of the no transfer of ownership characteristic is a special kind of specific investments. According to WILLIAMSON (1987) important elements of specificity are site specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset specificity and dedicated assets. Especially these dedicated investments does have a peculiar quality in service transactions. As defined above service transactions consist of the limited in time transfer of property rights without transfer of complete ownership according to a contractual agreement. Therefore either the customer temporal dedicates assets to the service provider as in case of abusus or the provider dedicates assets to the customer as in cases of usus and fructus. The property rights are only limited in time transferred and at the end of the transaction no exchange good will be produced on which complete ownership will be transferred or which could be sold to third parties. From the providers point of view this implies that all dedicated costs to serve the property of the customer are irreversible and could not be recovered by selling any produced exchange good. If the service consists of suppliers asset usage by the customer, the danger of not being payed arise. No reserved ownership can be kept since no exchange good is produced on which ownership should be transferred. The dedicated time and costs for lending assets are irreversible lost. These specific dedicated investments are therefore completely sunk costs (KAAS and SCHADE 1993). Since no exchange good is produced on which somebody could held ownership, there does not exists any second best alternative for selling the produced performance. Therefore the value of a service in a second best alternative is zero and the *quasi-rent* (WILLIAMSON 1987) is equal to the price of the service. According to transaction costs theory the quasi-rents create dependence due to being "locked-in" (WILLIAMSON 1987). Depending on the relative value of dedicated investments, and depending on the temporal duration of dedication of investments different degrees of interdependence could be distinguished (KAAS and SCHADE 1993). In general one can assume the following relationship:

*Proposition 2: "The higher the relative value (relative to the owners total assets) of the dedicated investments in terms of resources devoted to an actor, and the longer the temporal duration of dedication, the higher will be the value and the importance of the bond for that party that temporal transfers the property rights on the asset to another actor".*

### **3.3 Business Relationships as a Consequence of Service Interaction**

Looking from the perspective of neo-institutional economics and based on the identified two peculiarities of the no transfer of ownership characteristic, the affinity between relationships and service interaction in the service marketing literature (GRÖNROOS, 1990) does receive a new explanation. In this interpretation relationships seem to be a necessary consequence of the economic features of services. This implication is based on a contractual perspective, and it can be deduced from the incentive problems, the dedicated investments and from the indivisibility of time.

As already mentioned the limited in time transfer of certain property rights to another actor implies an overlapping of two ownership spheres. This overlapping could also be interpreted as economic interaction constituting a relationship. The resulting temporal connection between supplier and customer also corresponds to the definition of PLINKE (1997) who

regards relationships as a set of repeating transactions that are not coincidental. From a contractual perspective a common set of elements between the interaction approach, relationships, services and property-rights can be suggested. According to HAKANSSON and SNEHOTA (1995) through interaction between companies over time business relationships are created that can be considered as a kind of quasi-organisation. On the other hand, the property-rights theory considers, organisations as networks of contractual relations. As one kind of contractual relation we have investigated service contracts where the specified performance consists of a limited in time transfer of property rights. From a contractual point of view service contracts therefore could also be regarded as constituting a project-like quasi-organisation which implies the existence of relationships. In this sense relationships are an economic by-product of service interaction in terms of contractual relations controlling the transfer of property-rights.

Moreover, an economic relationship is also implied by the dedicated investments that are completely sunk costs in the case of services. They create dependence on the party that is most "locked" in its sunk costs. The degree of interdependence caused by dedicated investments corresponds to the "amount at stake" in relationships as developed by SOELLNER (1993). With increasing specificity the amount at stake creates increasing dependence of being in a relationship. Therefore the party that has dedicated the most investments and therefore has the highest amount at stake, will be locked in most in the service relationship. The dedicated sunk costs create "switching costs" (PLINKE 1997) and the party that is locked in most in the relationship, is forced to stay.

Furthermore, the discussed problem of negative incentives due to intended or unintended incomplete specification of property rights implies relationships too. The lateral or bilateral transfer of property rights between service supplier and customer creates uncertainty on the behaviour of both parties involved. There will be the danger that both actors will not handle the other ones property in the same way as their own since they do not bear the full cost and benefits of their actions. In order to keep control on the behaviour of the other party, again a relationships can be suggested as an adequate governance mechanism that economise on transaction costs of monitoring and safeguarding against opportunism (WILLIAMSON 1987).

Indivisibility of time plays also an important role for an economic explanation of relationships in service businesses. From the customers point of view, since property rights on her property are only temporal transferred to the supplier, a customer can not use more than one service at the same time that concerns the same object of her property (e.g. a car can be repaired only by one service station at the same time). In contrast, it is possible to possess a great diversity from the same exchange good at the same time since possession and usage are not interrelated as in the case of services. Therefore it can be assumed that due to the indivisibility of time, in services a customer will tend to use less services of the same kind as it would be possible in the case of possessing exchange goods. This will strengthen the tendency for customer and service provider to opt for a close relationship too.

All these arguments generate mutual interdependence between service provider and customer that makes a relationship a necessary consequence of the economic features of services. However it leads to the finding that business relationships in the service industry still remain a design variable for the service provider. In order to promote and facilitate exchange of services the influence of missing transfer of ownership has to be considered by a marketer in the service sector. The willingness to engage in service exchanges may only be given by

using an appropriate institutional design of a governance mechanism that fits to the characteristics of the transaction. Institutions like exchange of mutual "credible commitments", "trust" and "reputation" can be explained from this economic point of view. Therefore business relationships in the service sector are two sides of the same coin. First, the limited in time transfer of Property Rights creates a relationship by its very nature, on the other hand to attract and keep the customer within that relationship, suppliers of services have to design an favourable perceived relationship in the eyes of the customer, accordingly. From the suppliers point of view the perfect position is if the customer stays in the relationship because she wants to stay and she has to stay due to being "locked in" (PLINKE 1997). KAAS and SCHADE (1993) have analysed different factors and parameters that influence the structure of commitment and interdependence caused by dedicated investments that are sunk costs (e.g. the kind of contract, the time of payment, litigation of the contract ). These are important design variables for achieving such a comfortable position of wanting to stay and having to stay in a relationship. Based on the discussed theoretical considerations concerning the affinity between relationships and services, the following third proposition can be suggested:

*Proposition 3: "Due to incentive problems and dedicated investments caused by the missing transfer of ownership characteristic, service transactions are more likely to be co-ordinated by hybrid governance mechanisms (e.g. relationships) as exchange goods. A transaction buying will be more likely to escape into an relationship buying and a transaction selling will be more likely replaced by a relationship selling. Therefore a Relationship Marketing seem to be an adequate programme for facilitating service transactions".*

Yet, these economic aspects discussed have not been further investigated by traditional concepts of relationship marketing for services. However as suggested, it could provide a new challenge for future research on this important marketing topic. Most interestingly, the whole service sector including information related services and services provided by non-profit organisations and the government could be integrated within one theoretical concept. Hereby, a small contribution towards an economic based foundation for the relationship marketing concept could be delivered.

## **References**

ALCHIAN, Armen, A. und WOODWARD, Susan (1988): The Firm is Dead; Long Live the Firm. A Review of Oliver E. Williamson's The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, in: JoEL, Vol. 26, 1988, p. 65-79.

ARROW, K.J. (1974): The Limits of Organization, New York: Norton, 1974.

BOWEN, David, E. und JONES, Gareth, R.(1986): Transaction Cost Analysis of Service Organization-Customer Exchange, in: AoMR, Vol. 11., 1986, No. 2, p. 428-441.

FURUBOTN, Eirik, G. RICHTER, Rudolf (1991): The New Institutional Economics: An Assessment, in: The new Institutional Economics: a collection of articles from the Journal of institutional and theoretical economics, introd. and ed. by Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter, Tübingen: Mohr, 1991.

GRÖNROOS, Christian (1990a): Service Management and Marketing. Managing the Moments of Truth in Service Competition, Lexington (MA): Lexington, 1990.

GRÖNROOS, Christian (1990b): Relationship Approach to Marketing in Service Contexts: The Marketing and Organizational Interface, in: Journal of Business Research, Vol. 20, 1990, no.1, p.3-11.

GUMMESSON, Evert (1996): Relationship Marketing and Imaginary Organizations: A Synthesis, in: European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 30, 1996, p.31-44.

HAKANSSON, Hakan; SNEHOTA, Iwan (Ed.): Developing Relationships in Business Networks, London: Routledge, 1995.

JOHNS, Nick (1999): What is the thing called service?, in: European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 33, 1999, no. 9/10, p.958-973.

JONES, Gareth, R. (1990): Governing Customer-Service Organization Exchange, in: JoBR, Vol. 20, 1990, no. 1, p.23-29.

JUDD, Robert, C. (1964): The Case for Refining Services, in: JoM, Vol. 28, 1964, January, p.58-59.

KAAS, Klaus, P. and SCHADE, Christian (1993): Bindungsstärke in Kooperations- und Geschäftsbeziehungen am Beispiel der Dienstleistung Unternehmensberatung, in: Thelen Eva, M.; Mairamhof, Gaby, B. (Ed.) Dienstleistungsmarketing, Frankfurt/M u.a.: Lang, 1993, p.73-99.

KIRCHNER, Christian, and PICOT, Arnold (1987): Transaction Cost Analysis of Structural Changes in the Distribution System: Reflections on Institutional Developments in the Federal Republic of Germany, in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 143, 1987, p.62-81.

LOVELOCK, Christopher, H. (1996): Services Marketing, New York: Prentice Hall, 1996.

MANKIWI (1997): Principles of Economics, Fort Worth (TX): Dryden Press, 1997

PICOT, Arnold und FRANCK, Egon (1988): Die Planung der Unternehmensressource Information (I)+(II), in: WISU, 17. Jg., 1988, p.544-549, and p.608-618.

PLINKE, Wulff (1997): Grundlagen des Geschäftsbeziehungsmanagement, in: Kleinaltenkamp, Michael; Plinke, Wulff, (Ed.): Geschäftsbeziehungs-management, Berlin u.a.: Springer, 1997, p.1-62.

PLINKE, Wulff (2000): Grundlagen des Marktprozesses, in: Kleinaltenkamp, Michael; Plinke, Wulff (Ed.): Technischer Vertrieb, 2. Neubearb. und erw. Auflage, Berlin: Springer, 2000.

RATHMELL, John, M. (1974): Marketing in the Service Sector, Cambridge (MA): Winthrop, 1974.

RICHTER, Rudolf und FURUBOTN, Eirik (1996): Neue Institutionenökonomik, Tübingen: Mohr, 1996.

SHOSTACK, G. Lynn (1977): Breaking Free from Product Marketing, in Journal of Marketing, Vol. 41, 1977, no. 1, p.73-80.

SOELLNER, Albrecht (1993): Commitment in Geschäftsbeziehungen, Wiesbaden: Gabler, 1993.

WILLIAMSON, Oliver, E. (1987): The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, London: The Free Press, 1987.

ZEITHAML, Valerie, A. (1981): How Consumer Evaluation Prozesse differ between Goods and Services, in: Donnelly, James, H.; George, William, R. (Ed.): Marketing of Services, Chicago: AMA, 1981, p.186-190.